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ALLOCATING PUBLIC TIMBER BY TRANSFERABLE
PURCHASING QUOTAS: A POLICY ANALYSIS
DENNIS E. TEEGUARDENt

Federally-owned timber which is made available for conversion to
wood products by private firms is sold largely on the stump through
the device of an auction sale open to all qualified bidders. Numerous
proposals to change this long-standing policy have been put forth in
the name of achieving improved industrial efficiency, greater community stability, or more equitable distribution of income between
buyer and seller. The proposals cover a wide spectrum of viewpoints. One calls for the federal government to integrate its activities into wood processing, thus transferring this function to
public enterprise. At the other extreme, some persons advocate that
the federal government should sell its commercial forest land to
private firms and get out of the timber production business altogether.
Such proposals are helpful to the search for acceptable responses
to the widely recognized economic difficulties of the wood industries
in the western states.1 They give perspective to other policy proposals. But neither of the policy alternatives mentioned is likely to
be given serious attention; both are too extreme in their impact on
affected individuals and groups. The historical experience of forest
policy development in the United States is one of incremental change
following long debate. 2 Thus policy proposals which are relevant
are those which embody incremental or marginal changes in existing
policies or practices. If there is to be a change in timber sale policy,
the new policy will most likely emerge from a set of "incremental
policies." 3 These are policies which embody relatively small, potentially acceptable shifts in policy position as seen from the viewpoint
of those claimants who believe their welfare will be affected by the
proposed change.
Walter J. Mead's proposal 4 to establish a wholesale log market
t Associate Professor of Forestry, University of California at Berkeley.
1. For an analysis of these difficulties, see Mead, A Positive Proposal to Strengthen
the Lumber Industry, 40 Land Econ. 142 (1964).
2. S. Dana, Forest and Range Policy: Its Development in the United States 349
(1956).
3. A rationalization of this viewpoint is given by Lindblom, Policy Analysis, 48
Am. Econ. Rev. 298-312 (1958).
4. Mead, supra note 1, at 146. According to Mead, the benefits of the policy are:
improved possibilities for establishment of efficient, specialized milling operations; improved utilization of timber resources; reduction of capital required to purchase federal
timber; reduction of conflict between Forest Service and users in pricing matters; and
others. Disadvantages are: federal government would extend its business into log sell-
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on a pilot basis in or near the Willamette National Forest might be
viewed as an incremental policy. Under this policy, stumpage sales
would be abandoned. Instead, timber would be logged by private
firms for delivery at one of two concentration yards near the exits
of a national forest. There the logs would be sold by the federal
government from relatively uniform log decks at a price that would
clear the market.
This article will outline a policy alternative which might also be
viewed in a marginalist framework: sale of federal timber under a
system of transferable purchasing quotas. Mr. George Craig, Secretary-Manager of the Western Lumber Manufacturers, Inc., first
suggested the policy as an option to be considered with other proposals. 5 Buyers of federal timber have not urged that a quota policy
be adopted. But a quota policy may yield various benefits and also
has precedents in public resource allocation policy. Thus the quota
policy concept appears to merit serious study.
Following is a description of how a transferable purchasing quota
policy would operate, along with an analysis of arguments for and
against the policy, and a review of existing public policies which
resemble the proposed policy in certain key respects. Objectives of
the discussion are: to present points of view on the merits of a quota
policy as a conceivable option to other policy proposals; and to stimulate analysis and discussion of policies under which public timber
resources are transferred to private ownership.
I
A PURCHASING QUOTA POLICY

Under present policy, federal timber which is to be cut and sold
is first appraised by the government to determine a minimum bid
price. The timber is then advertised for sale and inspection. Bids
are invited and received at an announced time and place. The auction
is open to any buyer who makes a deposit and meets other specified
qualifications. Sale is by either oral or sealed bidding, but oral bidding predominates.' The highest bidder above the minimum bid
price is awarded the timber, which is to be cut and removed from
government lands within a specified time.
ing; and a wholesale log market would not provide an assured supply of raw material
to any operator.
5. Craig, Possible Trends for Public Timber-CountervailingPower or Compound
Problems, Western Lumber Manufacturers, Inc. Mimeo 1002, San Francisco, Calif.
(1962).
6. The method of bidding is also at issue. See Mead, Natural Resource Disposal
Policy-Oral Auction Versus Sealed Bids, 7 Natural Resources J. 193 (1967). Under a
quota policy either method of bidding or both could be used.
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A transferable purchasing quota system, in contrast, would have
these features:
1. Federal timber is sold in an auction sale (the general policy
now), but only qualified buyers holding purchasing quotas can bid.
Salvage and other normally small sales are made outside this quota
requirement.
2. Purchasers may buy up to three times the annual quota in any
year, but cannot exceed three quotas in any three-year period.
3. Initially, quotas are distributed to all firms which purchased
federal timber during the preceeding five years. Quotas given each
firm are equivalent to the average annual purchase during the
period. Defunct firms are eliminated.
4. Distributed quotas are equivalent to the annual allowable cut
of the forest or other appropriate administrative unit. If the allowable cut is decreased, the reduction is prorated among quota holders
in proportion to their quotas. Holders are allowed to claim capital
losses on recalled quotas.
5. Quota holders can sell their purchasing quotas to either existing operators or to new firms entering the industry.
6. Timber is sold to and priced by the successful high bidder, as
now. Current procedures for setting refusal price (appraised price)
continue.
Some clarifying comments are in order. First, following future
study, certain operating details of the proposed policy may be
changed without altering its substantive nature. These details might
include changing the maximum purchase in any given year, limiting
the quotas which one firm might acquire to a certain proportion of
the total, and extending or shortening the base-period used to calculate quota shares. These matters are vitally important to purchasers, but their resolution would leave fundamental policy unchanged. Second, the policy would not exclude any firms which had
purchased timber during the past five years from continuing to purchase equivalent average annual amounts. This feature is important
from the standpoint of the policy's potential acceptability to the
industry. However, a firm wishing to expand federal timber purchases would have to bid additional quotas away from other operators. Third, a quota holder could sell all or part of the quotas
which he holds. Fourth and finally, the quota does not constitute a
limit on a processer's production or total raw material purchases; it
limits only the amount of timber purchased from the federal
government.
The immediate aim of a purchasing quota policy differs from
Mead's proposal, although a similar objective is sought: improved
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industrial performance. A purchasing quota policy would seek to
create market conditions favorable to development of large scale,
efficient, stable, wood processing units. It would seek to reduce
market uncertainties, a barrier to investment in such units dependent
on federal timber, by: (a) providing raw material supply security
equivalent to the quotas held; and (b) by reducing or eliminating
the tendency to bid up stumpage prices or engage in "price wars"
under conditions where installed processing capacity exceeds timber
supply. The industry has asked for relief from the harsh impact of
this kind of market behavior.
II

ARGUMENTS FOR QUOTA POLICY
Under current practice, a firm which processes federal timber has
no assurance that it can acquire any given amount of timber over the
relatively long period during which plant investments are recovered.
Timber sale contracts normally run from one to three years, after
which the purchaser must again succeed in being a high bidder.
Timber, of course, is not available within a firm's procurement area
in unlimited amounts at going prices. If a firm fails to outbid rivals
in a particular sale, it may have to close down for want of timber
even if it were willing to pay close to the high bid price for another
similar tract. True, this prospect may provide powerful incentive to
minimize costs and adopt efficient utilization practices in order to
attain maximum bidding capability. But, at the same time, uncertainty regarding future timber availability may constitute a barrier
to investments in the size of enterprise most capable of exploiting
economies and advantages of large scale. According to an industry
authority:
Such investments cannot be justified without a sure supply of the raw
material, wood. The record makes it completely clear that the sources
of such investment capital do not consider public timber sold under
short-term contracts as an adequate basis for such investment.7

Historically, the lumber industry has experienced marked cyclical
fluctuations in demand over the business cycle. 8 Coupled with relatively easy conditions of entry, this has produced a persistent imbalance between capacity and timber supply. Some firms which have
7. Zivnuska, National Forest Timber Sales: Alternative Approaches to the Problems of Today and Tomorrow, 90 Forest Industries 40 (1963).
8. Zivnuska, Business Cycles, Building Cycles, and Commercial Forestry, Institute
of Public Relations, New York (1952); Mead, The Changing Cyclical Character of
Residential Construction and its Impact on Lumber Production and Prices, Proc. ThirtySixth Annual Conference Western Economic Ass'n 32-39 (1960).
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exhausted possible timber supplies face the prospect of closure unless
they are successful in purchasing public timber. In such circumstances they may bid away fixed costs and profits to avoid closure
and to minimize financial losses. Desperation circumstances of this
kind explain excessive or cutthroat bidding in some federal timber
sales. Thus, market uncertainty in wood procurement is aggravated
further.
If entry into auction sales were restricted to quota holders, effective purchasing capacity would be equivalent to the allowable cut of
timber. This should reduce or eliminate the impact of excess
capacity, both current and future, on the pricing of federal timber.
Excess capacity itself however, will not be affected. Each purchaser
already dependent to some degree on federal timber would be provided raw material security equivalent to the past five-year average
annual purchases at no less than appraised price. Since purchasing
quotas can be bought and sold, a mechanism would exist wherein
the optimum number, size, and nature of firms in the industry could
adjust in response to profit incentives. Efficient producers, i.e., those
which are maximizing profits through choice of optimum technology,
size of plant, rate of output, and product mix, could bid quotas
away from less efficient purchasers and could expand their supply
base. Normal incentives to reduce costs and to market high-value
products in order to maximize bidding capability would continue to
operate in a quota system. With transferable quotas, public timber
should tend to be optimally allocated to economically efficient producers. Firms which could accumulate sufficient quotas would be in
a position to make long-term investments in plant and marketing
organizations of sufficiently large scale to enable effective competition to survive in the highly competitive building materials market.
Improvements in timber resource utilization would be achieved
through development of plants which could install chipping equipment and integrate into related products like plywood and paper.
Technological progress, which has been relatively slow in the lumber
industry, would be increased by a greater capability for product
research and development-activities where economies of scale are
important. Finally, public policy objectives of community development and stability would be better served by efficient, stable, progressive processing units capable of survival in a rapidly changing
economy.
As a final argument, in the long-run a quota policy might increase
the stumpage prices received by the federal government in comparison to those which would prevail under current policy. This
could conceivably result in part from a reduction in the cost of risk
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and uncertainty in the minds of purchasers who are wholly or partially dependent on federal timber. Furthermore, "if timber is
appraised at a residual value (as now), and if changes in timber
sale policy permit the development of integrated utilization facilities
by assuring a timber supply, a portion of the increased realization
would automatically go to increased stumpage rates."'
III
ARGUMENTS AGAINST A QUOTA POLICY

The most important argument against a quota policy is that it
would create a barrier to entry into the industry and thus reduce
effective competition in the federal timber market. This would decrease incentives for attaining economic efficiency. Quota holders,
being guaranteed a certain supply of timber over a period of time,
would lose an incentive for maximizing bidding capability. Furthermore, quota holders might be tempted to collude in purchasing
federal timber by agreeing beforehand which firm is to be the successful high bidder on a specific offering. Collusive arrangements
would also reduce efficiency incentives. Finally, there is no reason to
suppose that an efficient firm could always pay a sufficiently high
price for quotas to induce an inefficient firm to give up its quotas.
The latter would rationally choose to hold its quotas if the present
value of anticipated future net revenue were less than the salvage
value of the plant (which would be closed if the firm no longer
was able to obtain federal timber) plus the market value of the
quotas. Eventually, as salvage value decreases, the firm could be
induced to sell its quotas. However, a quota system may introduce
a time lag in the shift of timber inputs from the inefficient to the
efficient producer.
Whether in fact a quota policy would result in more or less economic efficiency is a question which cannot be resolved here. The
key assumption behind a quota policy is that in continuing to sell
public timber at an auction sale open to all holders of unfilled quotas
and in providing for transferable quotas, the market mechanism
will continue to offer incentives to lower costs, to establish optimum
size plants and rates of output, and to engage in optimum utilization
practices. Price competition in finished product markets would, of
course, continue to provide incentives to lower costs and maximize
conversion values.
Reducing the degree of competition in federal timber markets
may be objectionable on general grounds. However, if reducing
9. Letter from George A. Craig to Dennis E. Teeguarden, April 21, 1965.
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competition leads to improved economic performance, then a clear
social choice exists. The Congress has given legal sanction to noncompetitive market devices such as acreage allotments, production
quotas, and marketing orders. Thus the question is whether the
potential economic costs and antithetical policies associated with
reducing competition in federal timber markets and providing raw
material security is sufficiently offset by prospective gains in industry
performance.
One might argue that the motives for collusion in purchasing federal timber are greater under current practices than under the proposed policy. A firm's uncertainty regarding its ability to acquire
needed timber, and the threat of an outsider suddenly successfully
bidding on a timber offering considered to be situated in its operating area, provide incentive to seek collusive arrangements in which
such uncertainties can be eliminated. A quota system would not
eliminate an environment conducive to collusion, but it would reduce
the importance of the above two reasons for seeking such an arrangement with rival firms. In any case, actual collusion involving
restraint of trade would come under the purview of anti-trust laws
and thus could be dealt with under established legal principles and
procedures.
One problem stems from the potential windfall which may be
realized from the sale of purchasing quotas by their initial holders.
In theory, holders could sell their quotas for a price equivalent to
the capitalized value of expected extra-normal profits realized from
selling products manufactured from federal timber. It is not inevitable that quotas command a positive price, but since initial recipients
pay nothing for their quotas, the worst outcome is no gain while
any positive price would be a windfall. 10 Subsequent quota holders,
of course, could experience losses as well as gains in exchanging
quotas, depending on profit expectations among quota buyers and
sellers.
10. Theoretically, quota prices would be zero under postulated conditions in the
economic model of long-run static competitive equilibrium. There is no incentive for
firms to enter or leave the industry, since neither losses nor extra-normal profits are
being incurred. Existing firms are just covering all production costs, including a rate
of return on invested capital equal to what this capital could earn in alternative employments. Firms in the industry have no incentive to increase output. They are producing the optimum rate of output with optimum-size plants; and the additional costs of
an additional unit of output just equal additional revenue from its sale. The value of a
quota for purchasing additional timber input would be zero, because additional output
would be sold at a loss. No firm would be willing to pay a positive price for a quota.
However, in a dynamic economy changing profit opportunities may lead to positive and
changing quota prices. Even if industry equilibrium were attained, expectations of increasing demand and product prices would create a demand for quotas by firms wishing to expand output or enter the industry.
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Initial quota holders could be placed in the same position as subsequent holders if quotas were distributed by competitive bid. Part
of the possible windfall from resale would then be transferred to the
government. An objection to this approach is the possible disruption
of the current pattern of federal timber allocation which might result. Allowing an initial windfall may be preferable to the alternative
of causing hardship on operators whose investment in plant and
equipment would be jeopardized if the firm was unsuccessful in acquiring quotas. An alternative approach is to treat quotas as a capital investment and to subject quota exchanges to the usual capital
gains income tax treatment. In this way the government can capture
some portion of the windfall which arises because of the necessity of
possessing a purchasing quota, but at the same time assume some
portion of the risk associated with investing in quotas. Initial quota
holders, having no original investment in their quotas, might be subject to a 100 percent capital gains tax.
Other arguments against a quota policy are: (a) administrative
requirements would increase the cost of the federal timber sale program; (b) it would complicate existing federal timber sale policies
further; (c) to the extent that quotas take on marketable values, it
would increase the capital required for entry into the industry or for
consolidation of existing firms through merger; (d) it would increase the fixed costs of processing and thus decrease industry output flexibility.
IV
POLICY PRECEDENTS FOR A QUOTA SYSTEM

Compared to prevailing practice, a quota system may appear to
represent an extreme shift in policy position. Yet congress has established policies for allocating federal timber which resemble a quota
system in certain key respects. A review of these policies will provide further perspective on the merits and potential acceptability of
a quota policy.
The Management Act of 1937" established authority for managing the revested Oregon and California railroad grant lands under
sustained-yield principles by the Department of Interior, Bureau of
Land Management. Under authority of this Act, the Secretary of
Interior established twelve marketing areas. Timber within an area
was sold only to firms operating primary manufacturing facilities
within its boundaries. Thus the marketing area functioned as an allocative device. The Act also authorized cooperative agreements
with other federal or state forest administrative agencies, or with
11. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1181 Wa-Mf

(1964-).
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private forest owners and operators, for the coordinated administration of intermingled or adjacent public and private forest lands.
Under such agreements, federal timber contained in cooperative
sustained yield units would be sold under contract to a single firm at
appraised prices rather than to a high bidder in an auction sale. At
present, no cooperative agreements have been made for reasons
which will be discussed below. Also, marketing units were abandoned
in 1957.12
The Sustained-Yield Forest Management Act 13 was aimed at
promoting sustained yield management of public and private forest
lands. It authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to organize two
types of management units: cooperative sustained-yield units and
federal sustained-yield units. The former are similar to the cooperative units authorized by the Management Act of 1937. Under longterm contracts, private and public timber lands would be combined
into a single management unit, and all federal timber sold to the
dependent plant without competitive bidding at appraised prices.
Federal sustained-yield units can be set up anywhere in national forests, and do not require cooperating firms to have timberland as a
basis for eligibility. A portion of the allowable cut on federal units
is usually reserved for open auction sale.
Allocating public timber by transferable purchasing quotas appears to differ slightly from the two policies discussed above. These
policies were intended to promote industry efficiency and stability,
foster community development and stability, and favor efficient resource use. Both Acts authorized a change from an auction sale open
to all comers to a policy of allocating timber to either a particular
firm or groups of firms. In assuring dependent firms that they could
purchase predetermined amounts of public timber, the policies are
identical with the proposal under study, with the exception of the
marketing unit arrangement on "0. and C." lands. Both Acts involved a redistribution of "rights" to purchase public timber from
one group of potential buyers to another group or to a single buyer.
Establishment of a quota policy would involve a similar redistribution of purchasing "rights" although the immediate practical impact
of the transfer may be negligible. One difference between this proposal and the Acts discussed is that allocation and pricing of any
specific block of timber under the proposed quota policy would be
determined in an auction sale as at present.
Opposition was encountered in implementing the Acts of 1937 and
12. By order of Secretary of Interior, April 1, 1957.
13. 16 U.s.c. § 583 (1964).
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1944. Influential groups found the expressed policies unacceptable
in practice. 1 4 Sixteen years after enactment of the Sustained-Yield
Act, one cooperative and five federal units had been organized. No
cooperative units have been established on "0. and C." lands. Initially active in attempting to implement legislative policy, the Forest
Service has now adopted a passive attitude toward establishing additional cooperative or federal sustained yield units. Existing units
have survived although units on "0. and C." lands have been
abandoned.
Reasons why the Acts of 1937 and 1944 were unacceptable to
certain groups are important to the present analysis. As is often the
case in public policy formation, there was agreement on policy objectives but disagreement on the means of attaining stated goals. Opposition reflected certain consequences which had not been anticipated during hearings preceding passage of the acts. In hearings
held to discuss establishment of proposed cooperative, federal, or
marketing units, the objectives of promoting stability of forestbased communities and sustained-yield management of private and
public forest lands were not challenged. 5 Rather, opposition was
directed to the instruments to be used. Mr. Adams reviewed the
nature of this opposition. 6 Briefly paraphrasing his findings, the
main objections focused on the consequences of redistributing the
privileges and benefits of access to federal timber. Purchasers and
communities excluded from proposed cooperative or federal units
claimed that the units would allow monopoly rather than competi14. The Act of 1944 passed the Senate and House without debate and after a single,
brief hearing in the House. The bill was presented as a conservation measure. In the
hearings, questions concerning the monopsonistic aspects of the allocation policy were
satisfied by the argument that there would be adequate safeguards of the public interest. No one spoke against the bill in committee. The primary issues discussed in the
hearings preceding passage of the Management Act of 1937 were the needs of affected
counties for revenue from the 0. and C. lands and the necessity of placing the lands
under sustained-yield management. Overshadowed by these two problems, the matter of
cooperative agreements and coordinated management of 0. and C. lands with lands in
other ownerships was discussed only in the most general terms.
15. Enabling legislation provided that local public hearings would be held before
cooperative or federal units were established. These hearings proved to be a more
effective device for resolving conflicting claims than the congressional hearings and
debate. Neither act was challenged by adversely affected groups except at the local
level. Two explanations are plausible: first, how the "equilibrium" of affected groups
would be disturbed could not be determined until an attempt was made to implement
the policy in a specific area; second, some groups lacked access to policy-determining
points at the congressional level, but attained access in local hearings.
16. Adams, Cooperative and Federal Sustained Yield Units: A Problem in Resource Management, 1952, at 110-127 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Michigan).
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tion, would discriminate against certain users and communities, and
would assure cooperating firms bargain prices.7

A quota policy would not require establishment of geographical
marketing units which would exclude some communities and plants
from the "benefits" of processing public timber. In this respect, it
does not differ from the policy under which the bulk of federal timber is now sold. Neither will it allocate timber from specific areas to
specific firms at appraised prices-a procedure which has been criticized because it constitutes "monopoly" and because bargain prices
would ensue due to the lack of competitive bidding. The allocation
and pricing of specific blocks of timber would be established in an
auction sale as is presently the case. However, only firms with quotas
could bid, and then only if their quotas were unfilled.' 8 Since all firms
which have purchased timber over the previous five-year period will
be able to bid, the general market situation will be unaltered.
Distributing quotas on the basis of five-year purchasing experience
may not exclude any buyers in some areas; in others, it may exclude
some mills, particularly the smaller mills which may not have purchasing experience as a basis for obtaining quotas. If questions regarding "monopoly" and pricing are settled, quota distribution
would raise the most severe test of the acceptability of the proposal.
The Small Business Act of 1958'9 also established policies under
which public timber is allocated to a specific group of users. This act
stated:
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Government should
aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible, the interests of
small business concerns in order to preserve free competitive enterprise . . . to ensure that a fair proportion of the total sales of Government property be made to such enterprises .... 20

The Small Business Administration (SBA) and the U.S. Forest
Service developed a program of timber sales specifically for and
17. The proposed cooperative unit at Woodleaf, California, was defeated. Opposing

groups were: Oroville Chamber of Commerce, Post of Veterans of Foreign Wars, Disabled American Veterans, Kiwanis Club, Rotary Club, Fellows Club, and American
Legion; the City of Oroville; City of Marysville; Marysville District Chamber of Commerce; Yuba County Board of Supervisors; and the Wyandotte Grange at Woodleaf.
There is overlapping membership among these groups. The dominating interest group
is the city community, in this case a community whose mills would have been excluded
from purchasing timber in the federal unit.
18. Situations could arise, of course, where all firms but one have filled their quotas,
or else are not interested in bidding. Bidding would then be limited to one firm and
price would be the appraised price. Situations like this arise under present timber sale
policy. In the absence of collusion, the distribution of sales by number of bidders may
not be significantly different than at present.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1953), as amended 15 U.S.C. 631(a) (1961).
20. Id.
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restricted to firms which qualify as "small." Other firms cannot bid
on public timber sales classified as SBA "set-aside" sales. The intent
is to help operators obtain a share of public timber roughly in proportion to their capacity by restricting entry into auction sales and
by offering small tracts for sale, and to preserve competition by
protecting small firms from their rivals.
The SBA program has not been very important, largely due to
the lack of demand for "set-aside" sales. A small firm is defined as
one with 500 employees or less. This definition excludes very few
firms from bidding on "set-aside" sales. At the same time, reducing
sale size and terms enhances the ability of loggers as well as mill
operators to bid on public timber. As a result, competition faced by
small mills is increased. Present opinion regarding the "set-aside"
policy is divided; some mills which qualify as small oppose it while
others favor it. The Forest Service considers the program a drain
on its ability to administer the overall public timber sale program
and believes that "set-asides" should be used only when regular
procedures fail to allocate timber in an "equitable" manner, i.e., allocations in proportion to total milling capacity.
This third case of departure from general timber sale policy and
procedures resembles a purchasing quota system in two respects:
first, in the basic principle of restricting access to public timber to a
certain class of purchasers; and second, in that pricing and allocation
of a specific timber sale is by auction sale open to qualified bidders.
Under long-standing statutes and administrative authority, sale
of grazing services on federal lands has been by permits allowing
the holder to graze specified numbers of livestock for certain periods
on certain areas. Essentially, permits are purchasing quotas which
allow the holder to harvest a specified volume of productive services. Permits are awarded for periods up to ten years, thus assuring
access to a roughly predetermined amount of grazing use.
Administrative authority to allocate grazing rights through permits or quotas on public domain lands was derived from the Taylor
Grazing Act of 1934.21 Purposes of this act were:
To stop injury to the public grazing lands by preventing overgrazing
and soil deterioration, to provide for their orderly use, improvement,
and development, to stabilize the livestock
industry dependent upon
22
the public range, and for other purposes.

To accomplish these objectives, the Secretary of Interior was
authorized to establish grazing districts on public lands which in his
21. 48 Stat. 1269 (1934), 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315(g), (h)-(m), (n), (o) (1) (1964).
22. 48 Stat. 1269 (1934).
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opinion were valuable chiefly for grazing. According to other provisions, preference in allocating grazing rights on what formerly was
open range was accorded to owners of land or water who: (1)
could also support their livestock on their own land during periods
when they were off the grazing district; (2) required the federal
lands in conjunction with their own to form an economic ranching
unit; and (3) had used public range during the five-year period prior
to passage of the act. The purpose of the last provision was to assure that the allocation of permits was approximately consistent
with patterns of use which had long been established on previously
open range. Permit distribution was worked out by means of mutual
agreement between applicants, district advisory boards, and the district range manager who represented the Department. Permits are
attached to a specific ranch, not to the owner or to the livestock.
The Acts of 189723 and 195024 granted the Secretary of Agriculture authority to permit, regulate, or prohibit grazing in the national forests. Administrative regulations promulgated under this
authority established allocation policies generally similar to those
applying to the Taylor grazing districts. Permits are distributed to
applicants on the basis of dependency, prior use, and similar criteria,
but are attached to lands or cattle.
Policies governing the allocation of federal grazing services resemble a transferable purchasing quota system for public timber.
Allocation of grazing services is by purchasing quotas which are
given on the basis of several measures of dependency and on prior
use. Under the present proposal, specific tracts of timber would be
priced and allocated by the market, while in the case of grazing, the
purchasing quota is tied to a specific area where services are priced
administratively. Similarities also exist in the transferability of
quotas. Forest Service grazing permits can be transferred to other
qualified holders through sale of the ranch or livestock to which the
permit is attached. The same policies apply to transfers of grazing
district permits except that these are not attached to livestock and
thus cannot be transferred along with them. The proposed quota
policy specifies that timber purchasing quotas would be transferable;
these quotas would not be attached to a specific mill and could be sold
separately from the mill.
V
AN INCREMENTAL POLICY?

To summarize, the basic change embodied in a purchasing quota
system for allocating federal timber as contrasted with present prac23. Sundry Civil Appropriations Act, 30 Stat. 34 (1897).

24. 16U.S.C.§580(1)

(1964).
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tices is to limit participants in auction sales to quota holders. The
most important effect from the viewpoint of the buyer is the reduction of uncertainty regarding the ability to purchase federal timber.
The main objective is to improve the economic efficiency of woodprocessing industries.
Is a purchasing quota system better than the present system? No
policy analyst is sufficiently omniscient to answer the question. But
from the foregoing policy "data," it is concluded that allocating
public timber by use of transferable purchasing quotas is an incremental policy that should receive serious study along with other
options. In both objectives and means, a purchasing quota system
resembles existing statutory and administrative policies which were
reviewed above. More importantly, a quota system answers objections to these earlier policies. As such, a purchasing quota system
apparently involves less of a shift in policy position, and thus may
be more acceptable than its predecessors.
This article is intended to stimulate debate on the impact of federal timber sale policy on the long-run economic performance of the
wood-using industries. Federal policy cannot be neutral in its effect
on industry performance. Thus there is a continuing need to give
serious study to appropriate means and goals for federal timber re25
source allocation.

25. While work on this paper was in progress, a comprehensive review of alternative timber sale policies and their welfare consequences was initiated by W. R. Bentley.
The reader may wish to see his recently published report: Forest Service Timber Sales:
a Preliminary Evaluation of Policy Alternatives, 44 Land Econ. 205 (1968).

